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LOW-AIRSPEED PROTECTION FOR SMALL TO MEDIUM-SIZED COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES:
AN IMPORTANT SAFETY GAP
William J. Bramble, Jr.
National Transportation Safety Board, Office of Aviation Safety1
Washington, DC
Loren S. Groff
Charles M. Pereira
National Transportation Safety Board, Office of Research and Engineering
Washington, DC

In November 2003, the National Transportation Safety Board recommended that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) convene a panel of aircraft design, operations, and human factors specialists to examine the
feasibility of requiring the installation of low airspeed alerting devices on airplanes operating commercially under 14
C.F.R. Parts 121 and 135. The Board further recommended that if the panel determined such a requirement to be
feasible, the FAA should establish requirements for low-airspeed alert systems. This paper discusses the reasoning
behind these recommendations, explores relevant accident history from the Safety Board’s investigative records, and
discusses shortcomings of an approach to cockpit design that relies on flight crew monitoring and artificial stall
warnings for avoidance of low airspeed related accidents. Potential benefits and concerns associated with the
installation of a new kind of low airspeed alerting device are also addressed.
Introduction
On October 25, 2002, a Raytheon King Air A100 on
a non-scheduled Part 135 flight crashed 1.8 miles
short of the runway threshold during a VOR
approach to the Eveleth-Virginia Municipal Airport,
Eveleth, Minnesota.
Radar and weather data
indicated that the flight crew experienced difficulty
intercepting the approach course and performed a
steep, fast approach, which probably required them to
reduce engine power to very low levels. As the crew
descended, their airspeed slowly and steadily
decreased until it fell below recommended approach
speed. Airspeed continued to decrease at a rate of
approximately 1 knot per second for the last 48
seconds of flight. As the airplane reached the
minimum descent altitude in the landing
configuration, with its airspeed having decreased to
near the calculated stall speed, the airplane suddenly
rolled left, descended steeply, and impacted terrain.
All occupants were killed, including the late U.S.
Senator Paul Wellstone. The Safety Board found that
icing was not a factor, and determined that the
probable cause of this accident was “the flight crew’s
failure to maintain adequate airspeed, which led to an
aerodynamic stall from which they did not recover”
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2003).
In its final report on this accident, adopted on
November 18, 2003, the Safety Board urged the FAA

to convene a panel of aircraft design, aviation
operations, and aviation human factors specialists,
including representatives from the National Air and
Space Administration to determine whether a
requirement for the installation of low airspeed alert
systems in airplanes engaged in commercial
operations under 14 Code of Federal Regulations
Parts 121 and 135 would be feasible (NTSB
Recommendation No. A-03-53). The Board further
recommended that if the panel determined such a
requirement to be feasible, the FAA should establish
requirements for low-airspeed alert systems (NTSB
Recommendation No. A-03-54).
This paper
discusses the reasoning behind the Safety Board’s
recommendations, explores relevant accident history
from the Board’s investigative records, and discusses
shortcomings of the current cockpit design
philosophy relying on flight crew monitoring and
artificial stall warnings to avoid low airspeed related
accidents. Potential benefits and concerns associated
with the installation of a new kind of low airspeed
alerting device are also addressed.
Background
Airspeed is a basic measure of airplane performance
monitored by flight crews. Angle of attack is the
angle between the chord line of an airplane’s wings
and the oncoming relative wind. All other things
held constant, when airspeed decreases, angle of
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attack must be increased to maintain lift. However, if
angle of attack is increased too much, critical angle
of attack can be exceeded, smooth airflow over the
wing will be disrupted, and an aerodynamic stall
results. A stall can occur at any airspeed, attitude, or
power setting, however, if airspeed is allowed to
decrease too much, a stall will reliably be produced.
Practicing aerodynamic stalls, and their recovery, is a
routine part of pilot training. However, inadvertent
stalls can be dangerous. This is especially true
during the takeoff, climb, approach, and landing
phases of flight. Inadvertent stalls are more likely
during these phases because operating airspeeds are
lower and stall speed margins are reduced. In
addition, lower altitudes make stall recovery less
certain. Flight crew airspeed monitoring is the first
line of defense against inadvertent stalls. To guard
against them, flight crews are trained to monitor
airspeed instruments and to maintain target airspeeds.
Stall warnings provide a second line of defense
against inadvertent stalls, serving as a backup to crew
monitoring. Federal airworthiness standards (14
C.F.R. Parts 23 and 25) require the presence of a
clear and distinctive warning capable of alerting the
crew of an impending stall. This warning cannot
require the crew’s visual attention inside the cockpit,
and must begin 5 or more knots above stalling speed
for normal and commuter category airplanes. For
transport category airplanes, it must begin at least 5
knots or 5 percent above stalling speed (whichever
value is greater).2 If the aerodynamic qualities of an
aircraft (e.g., buffeting) do not provide a clear and
distinctive warning meeting these requirements, an
artificial stall warning must be installed. Flight crews
are trained to begin stall recovery procedures if a stall
warning occurs during normal flight operations.
The widespread introduction of swept-wing jet
aircraft in commercial aviation in the 1960s brought
an increased emphasis on stall avoidance, because
stall recovery in such aircraft can be difficult or
impossible (Federal Aviation Administration, 2004).
Stick “pushers” installed on such airplanes were
designed to lower the nose before critical angle of
attack was exceeded, and artificial stall warning
systems were required to be calibrated to activate at
least five knots above stick pusher activation
thresholds. Additional stall protection measures were
developed in the late 20th century as manufacturers
of fly-by-wire transport category airplanes with
2

This requirement is reduced to 3 knots or 3 percent
above stall speed when flying straight and level at
idle power.

integrated autoflight systems developed flight
envelope protection systems to prevent airplanes
from exceeding high or low airspeed limitations. Full
authority envelope protection systems, such as those
installed on the Airbus A320, were made capable of
increasing engine power and even modulating the
effects of pilot control inputs to prevent exceedence
of the critical angle of attack (Vakil, 2000).
The Safety Gap
Despite advances in the state of the art in stall
avoidance and protection systems, many small to
medium-sized commercial turboprop and turbine
engine airplanes in use today still rely solely on flight
crew monitoring and artificial stall warnings to avoid
low airspeed-related accidents. This approach is
problematic for two reasons. First, flying involves
the time-sharing of multiple concurrent tasks, many
of which require flight crews to monitor multiple
displays. These tasks cannot always be performed
simultaneously. For this reason, successful flying
depends on effective prioritization and visual
scanning strategies (Wickens, 2003). The process by
which flight crews allocate their attentional resources
among concurrent flying tasks has been called
“cockpit task management” (Funk, 1991). Crews
must ensure that important flying tasks, such as
airspeed monitoring, receive adequate attention at
appropriate times and are not pre-empted by lower
priority tasks. Research has shown that pilots are
generally good at doing this. However, a variety of
evidence indicates that suboptimal cockpit task
management does sometimes occur and can have a
negative impact on safety (Wickens, 2003). Of
interest to the topic at hand, the authors of one early
study of flight crew performance in a full mission
flight simulation cited violations of airspeed
limitations (both high and low) as one of the most
common types of flying errors made by three-pilot
airline crews (Ruffel Smith, 1979).
A second problem with relying on pilot monitoring
and stall warnings for stall avoidance has to do with
characteristics of the stall warning itself. In theory,
stall warnings are designed so that flight crews can
prevent a stall by responding quickly to the
occurrence of a stall warning. Current airworthiness
requirements for transport category airplanes even
state that it must be possible for a test pilot to prevent
a stall during powered 1.5 G banked turns when stall
recovery is delayed for at least one second after the
onset of a stall warning.
However, certain
combinations of power changes and abrupt
maneuvering (such as a level-off at MDA with or
without structural icing) could reduce this margin of
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Low Airspeed / Stall Events
In light of known human monitoring weaknesses and
the potential inadequacy of artificial stall warnings, it
should come as no surprise that the Safety Board has
investigated numerous accidents and incidents
involving flight crew failure to monitor and maintain
airspeed. In some cases, loss of airspeed / stall
events have been preceded by aggravating factors
such as aircraft equipment or system failures that
made airspeed monitoring and maintenance more
difficult. Weather has also been an important
contributing factor for low-airspeed related events.
Aerodynamic stalls have occurred following
encounters with wind, turbulence, and convective
phenomena such as wind shear or microburst.
However, structural icing may be the most common
contributing factor.
Events involving flight crew failures to monitor
airspeed can occur during any phase of flight, as the
following example attests. On June 4, 2002, a Spirit
Airlines McDonnell Douglas MD-82 on a scheduled
Part 121 flight from Denver, Colorado to Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida experienced an aerodynamic stall
while cruising at 33,000 feet on autopilot. Fifteen
minutes into the cruise phase of flight, the crew felt a
sudden vibration, heard the stick shaker and stall
warning activate, noticed that their airspeed was low
and their engines were operating at a very low power
setting.
They also noticed that one engine’s
temperature was too high. The captain took manual
control of the airplane and shut down the hot engine.
Shortly thereafter, power rolled back on the good
engine as well. The flight crew managed to restore
power to both engines at 17,000 feet, and made a
precautionary landing. The Safety Board found that
the airplane’s engine inlet probes had become
blocked by ice crystals resulting in a false engine
pressure ratio indication and subsequent retarding of
the throttles by the auto throttle system. The Board
attributed the probable cause of this incident to the
flight crew’s failure to verify the engine instrument
indications and power plant controls while on

autopilot with the auto throttles engaged, and their
failure to recognize the drop in airspeed which led to
an aerodynamic stall associated with the reduction in
engine power (Safety Board No. CHI02IA151).
The authors searched records contained in the Safety
Board’s Aviation Accident/Incident Database,
looking specifically for low-airspeed events in the
approach and landing phases of flight where
equipment failure was not cited as a contributing
factor. This search identified 40 low airspeed-related
events since 1982. It is likely that additional cases of
hard landings and tail strikes have occurred but gone
unreported because they did not result in substantial
damage. The events identified were categorized by
type of operation (Part 121 versus Part 135) and by
involvement of structural icing (icing versus nonicing). The results of this categorization are shown in
Figure 1. This categorization indicates that lowairspeed events during approach and landing
occurred more often during Part 135 than Part 121
flight operations. The results also underscore the
prevalence of structural icing in such events.
However, that at least 19 of the low-airspeed related
accidents and incidents identified did not involve
icing or equipment failure.
25
20
Events

warning. Moreover, stall warnings can be unreliable
because of ice accumulation, which raises stall speed
and can degrade warning margins to the point where
little or no warning is provided. This phenomenon
was noted during the investigation of a 1997 accident
near Monroe, Michigan that caused the deaths of 29
people, and led the Safety Board to recommend that
the FAA apply more stringent certification
requirements to airplanes certified for operation in
icing conditions (National Transportation Safety
Board, 1998).
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Figure 1. Accidents and incidents during approach
or landing citing low airspeed, 1982-2004.
Most of the low-airspeed related non-icing events
involving Part 121 flight operations resulted in hard
landings and/or tail strikes causing substantial aircraft
damage, and none resulted in serious injuries.
During one typical incident, reported in 1996, the
Part 121 airline captain of a McDonnell-Douglas
MD-88 said he flew a normal, stabilized approach,
using normal flaps and a landing reference speed of
133 knots plus 5 knots. He reported flaring the
airplane over the runway and realizing that the sink
rate was not being arrested as desired. The captain
said he made a more “aggressive” pull on the control
yoke while advancing the thrust levers. The airplane
landed hard, sustaining substantial damage. Digital
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flight data recorder readout disclosed that airspeed
remained above 138 knots until, at an absolute
altitude of 238 feet, airspeed began steadily
decreasing below that speed. When the airplane
touched down on the runway, airspeed was 125 knots
and pitch attitude was 10.6 degrees nose up. There
was a +5.5 G vertical acceleration spike at
touchdown (Safety Board No. FTW96LA111).
By contrast, low-airspeed related non-icing events
involving Part 135 flight operations resulted in more
severe outcomes. Records of the investigations of
these events indicate that fatal injuries occurred in
approximately 1 out of every 4 cases. Part 135 flight
operations typically utilize smaller aircraft with less
sophisticated autoflight systems. They are less likely
to be equipped with auto throttles or sophisticated
envelope protection systems. Also, Part 135 flight
crews are often less experienced than Part 121 flight
crews, and Part 135 flight operations have less
stringent flight crew training requirements. These
factors could explain the higher prevalence of such
events in Part 135 flight operations, and the relative
severity of their outcomes.
The Safety Board investigated an accident in 1994,
involving a Jetstream 41 on a scheduled Part 135
commuter flight, which crashed 1.2 nautical miles
short of the runway during an ILS approach to the
Port Columbus International Airport, Columbus
Ohio, killing 5 and injuring 2 on board. The flight
crew initiated the landing checklist late in the
approach. The delay caused distractions to both
pilots, and the approach was unstabilized. The
autopilot was engaged during the approach, and it
kept the airplane on the localizer and glide slope.
However, power was set too low to maintain
airspeed. This airplane was not equipped with
autothrottles. The flight crew did not adequately
monitor airspeed indications, and the airplane
decelerated until it stalled. Although a stall warning
was heard, the captain failed to execute appropriate
stall recovery procedures, and the airplane descended
steeply, impacting a building. Icing was found not to
have been a factor in the accident. The Board found
the probable cause of this accident to be, in part, “an
aerodynamic stall that occurred when the flight crew
allowed the airspeed to decay to stall speed following
a very poorly planned and executed approach
characterized by an absence of procedural discipline”
(National Transportation Safety Board, 1994).
A Change in Design Philosophy
The introduction of a new kind of low-airspeed alert
associated with the minimum operationally

acceptable speed for a particular phase of flight could
help flight crews maintain airspeed awareness in
much the same way that altitude alert systems now
help flight crews maintain altitude awareness. Such a
system would provide an earlier cue to flight crews
about low and decreasing airspeed prior to the
occurrence of a stall warning, providing them with
more time to manage a potential problem before it
becomes an emergency.
Recommending a requirement for this kind of lowairspeed alert system represents a departure from the
previously accepted premise that adequate lowairspeed awareness is provided by flight crew
vigilance and existing stall warnings. However, the
history of accidents involving flight crew lack of
low-airspeed awareness suggests that flight crew
vigilance and existing stall warnings are inadequate
to prevent hazardous low-airspeed situations.
Moreover, the accident record suggests that this
safety issue is not limited to autopilot operations or
flight in icing conditions.
The introduction of a low airspeed alerting system
could prevent low airspeed / stall related accidents.
If a low-airspeed alert had been installed on the King
Air involved in the Eveleth accident and had
activated when airspeed dropped below 1.2 VS (about
92 knots), the flight crew could have received about
15 seconds advance warning before the airplane
decelerated to its stalling speed. This might have
directed the crew’s attention to the airplane’s
decaying airspeed in time to initiate appropriate
corrective action. Moreover, if such a system could
helped the crew maintain airspeed at or above a
minimum operational thresholds such as 1.2 VS, the
likelihood of an accelerated stall initiated by abrupt
last-second maneuvering could have been reduced,
and improved margins above stalling speed during
flight under icing conditions could have been more
reliably maintained.
The nature of the airspeed monitoring task varies
depending on the level of automation in an airplane
cockpit. During a manually flown, a pilot is actively
engaged in balancing airspeed, pitch, power, and
vertical speed in closed-loop fashion. This requires
frequent checking of the outside visual picture and
the flight instruments to guide control movements.
Alternatively, a pilot using the fully integrated
autoflight system in a modern transport airplane
monitors flight parameters, including airspeed, in a
more supervisory fashion. The issue of airspeed
awareness for crews using highly automated flight
management systems was raised in an FAA Human
Factors
Team
Report
(Federal
Aviation
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Administration, 1996). Expressing concern about a
history of accidents involving lack of low-airspeed
awareness among flight crews monitoring automated
systems, the report stated:

array of general aviation airplanes.
These
developments suggest that it may be feasible to
develop low airspeed alerting systems for most
airplane types.

Transport category airplanes are required to
have adequate warnings of an impending stall,
but at this point the airplane may already be in
a potentially hazardous low energy state.
Better awareness is needed of energy state
trends such that flight crews are alerted prior
to reaching a potentially hazardous low energy
state.

In a letter to the Safety Board dated April 12, 2004,
the FAA said it would study cases involving low
airspeed awareness that had been identified by the
Safety Board and determine what action should be
taken. The FAA described existing requirements for
stick shakers and stall warnings in transport category
airplanes, and cited the increasing prevalence of
color-coded visual displays of airspeed found in
many modern cockpits. The FAA also stated that it
would consider addressing the issue of low airspeed
awareness in efforts in progress under its Safer Skies
programs and other initiatives. However, as of
February 2005, the FAA had not yet announced
activities specifically aimed at addressing this issue.

The need for better low airspeed protection and
alerting was also cited by the FAA’s Flight Guidance
System (FGS) Harmonization Working Group of the
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee, when, in
March 2002, it proposed revisions to 14 C.F.R. Part
25.1329 and associated Advisory Circular 25.1329 to
require low-airspeed protection and alerting during
autopilot operations for newly certified transportcategory airplanes. The proposal stated:
The requirement for speed protection is based
on the premise that reliance on flight crew
attentiveness to airspeed indications, alone,
during FGS…operation is not adequate to
avoid unacceptable speed excursions outside
the speed range of the normal flight
envelope….Standard stall warning and high
speed alerts are not always timely enough for
the flight crew to intervene to prevent
unacceptable speed excursions during FGS
operation….A low speed alert and a transition
to the speed protection mode at approximately
1.2 VS, or an equivalent speed defined in
terms of Vsr, for the landing flap configuration
has been found to be acceptable.
The changes proposed for Part 25.1329 were aimed at
future transport category aircraft. However, it may
be feasible to develop low airspeed alert systems for
less sophisticated, existing airplanes as well.
Moreover, the FAA’s work, in combination with the
Safety Board’s accident and incident findings,
suggest a need for low airspeed alerting throughout a
variety of aircraft with a range of automated features.
A low airspeed alert was recently developed for
Embraer EMB-120 turboprop airplanes for use in
icing conditions. This low airspeed alert system
activates an amber-colored indicator light installed in
the control panel and provides an auditory alert when
airspeed drops below the minimum operational icing
speed. In addition, several avionics manufacturers
offer low airspeed alerting devices for use in a broad

Human Factors Concerns
Technical, operational, and human factors issues
must be carefully evaluated and addressed in
connection with the design and implementation of
any new cockpit alerting system (Pritchett, 2001).
Some issues that deserve consideration in association
with the possible introduction of new low airspeed
alerting systems include: the integration of this
system with other aircraft systems; the determination
of appropriate threshold speeds for alert activation;
examination of the impact of the system’s reliability
on flight crew confidence in the system; the selection
of appropriate strategies for differentiating the alert
from existing cockpit alerts and warnings; the
development of appropriate flight crew procedures
for use in conjunction with the system; and the need
for flight crew training in use of the system and
related procedures.
Clearly there are many concerns associated with the
possible introduction of these systems in commercial
airplanes. Despite these concerns, it is possible such
systems could significantly improve flight crew
performance and increase safety. This is a matter the
aviation psychology community is well suited to
address. Moreover, the aviation psychology research
community has a long history of suggesting and
evaluating alternative design solutions for new
aircraft systems through applied research.
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NTSB Case Numbers for Low Airspeed / Stall
Related Events During Approach and Landing3
Part 135 Icing Related
SEA82DA017
MKC89LA073
MKC85LA028
MKC84FA033
LAX02LA030
LAX02FA108
DEN90FA068
DEN83LA029
DEN04MA015
DEN01FA094
DCA97MA017
DCA90MA011
CHI98LA084
CHI98FA119
CHI95LA053
CHI86LA090
CHI85FA139
ANC89LA025
ANC02FA020
Part 135 Non Icing Related
MIA89LA193
DEN99FA137
DEN87FA042
DCA94MA027
DCA03MA008
CHI99LA078
CHI01LA109
ANC94LA031
ANC94LA021
ANC91LA015
ANC89LA039
ANC01LA053
Part 121 Icing Related
DCA87IA015
CHI90IA106
Part 121 Non Icing Related
NYC02LA013
LAX90FA148
LAX00LA192
FTW96LA111
BFO85IA036
ATL93IA135
ATL01A064

3

Information on these cases can be found at
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp.
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ATCS AGE AND EN ROUTE OPERATIONAL ERRORS: A RE-INVESTIGATION
Dana Broach
FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (AAM-520)
P.O. Box 25082, Oklahoma City, OK 73125
Public Law 92-297 requires that air traffic control specialists (ATCSs), hired on or after May 16, 1972, retire at age
56. This law is based on testimony given in 1971 that as controllers aged, the cumulative effects of stress, fatigue
(from shift work), and age-related cognitive changes created a safety risk (U.S. House of Representatives, 1971).
The hypothesis has been considered in two studies of en route operational errors (OEs) with contradictory results
(Center for Naval Analyses Corporation (CNAC), 1995; Broach, 1999). The purpose of this re-investigation was to
test the hypothesis that controller age, controlling for experience, was related to the occurrence of OEs using a
statistical method appropriate for rare events. A total of 3,054 usable en route OE records were extracted from the
FAA OE database for the period FY1997 through FY2003 and matched with air route traffic control center
(ARTCC) non-supervisory controller staffing records, resulting in a database of 51,898 records. Poisson regression
was used to model OE count as a function of the explanatory variables age and experience using the SPSS® version
11.5 General Loglinear (GENLOG) procedure. The Poisson regression model fit the data poorly (Likelihood Ratio
χ2 = 283.81, p < .001). The odds of OE involvement, estimated with the Generalized Log Odds Ratio, for older
controllers (GE age 56) were 1.02 times greater than the odds for younger (LE age 55) controllers, with a 95%
confidence interval of 0.42 to 1.64. The range of odds indicated that neither age group was less or more likely to be
involved in an OE, controlling for experience. This analysis does not support the hypothesis that older en route
controllers are at greater risk of involvement in an OE. This finding suggests that the original rationale for the
mandatory retirement of ATCSs may need to be re-evaluated. Additional research is recommended.
Public Law 92-297 requires that Air Traffic Control
Specialists (ATCSs), hired on or after May 16, 1972
by the FAA, retire at age 561. Controllers with
“exceptional skills and abilities” may be given a
waiver and continue working until reaching the 61st
birthday. The primary evidence offered in support of
the mandatory retirement of ATCSs at age 56 in 1971
consisted of anecdotal reports of stress from
controllers, studies of self-reported “stress-related”
symptoms, physiological correlates of stress, and
medical disability retirements of controllers. Despite
strong assertions made by various parties, no
testimony or data were presented in 1971 to
demonstrate that older controllers were more likely
than younger controllers to make errors that might
compromise the safety of flight.
Several studies of ATCS age and performance have
been conducted since passage of P.L. 92-297 (see
Broach & Schroeder, in press, for a review). A
variety of measures of job performance have been
examined in research, ranging from over-theshoulder subjective evaluations to computer-based
measures. Three studies focused specifically on
operational errors (OEs). An OE results when an
ATCS fails to maintain appropriate separation
between aircraft, terrain, and other obstacles to safe
flight. OEs are rare compared to the number of
operations handled in the U.S. air traffic system. For
example, there were 1,145 OEs in fiscal year (FY)
2000 compared to 166,669,557 operations, or 6.8
OEs per million operations (Pounds & Ferrante,

2003; DOT Inspector General, 2003a). Despite their
rarity, OEs may pose safety risks, depending on the
degree to which separation is lost, and are critical
safety indicators for the operation of the air traffic
control system (Department of Transportation
Inspector General, 2003a,b). OEs occur when
through a controller’s actions (or inaction), less than
standard separation is maintained.
Spahn (1977) investigated the relationship of age to
System Errors (now called Operational Errors) and
concluded that “no age group has neither more nor
less than its proportional share of system errors” (p.
3-35). The Center for Naval Analyses Corporation
(CNAC) found in 1995 that the likelihood of an OE
in the period January 1991 to July 1995 declined
dramatically in the first few years at an air route
traffic control center (ARTCC) and then appeared to
approach a constant value. However, CNAC did not
examine controller age nor control for age effects.
Broach (1999) re-analyzed the CNAC data set from
the perspective of controller age and found that the
likelihood of an OE might increase with age. The
regression analysis also found that experience might
mitigate the risk of an OE associated with increasing
age. Additional research on the relationship of
chronological age, experience, and OEs was
recommended. The present study builds on that
recommendation. This study was designed to test the
hypothesis that older controllers were more likely
than younger controllers to commit errors that
reduced the safety of flight.
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Method
Source Data
A total of 3,054 usable en route OE records were
extracted from the FAA Operational Error/Deviation
System (OEDS) for the period FY1997 through
FY2003. Records for controllers employed at
ARTCCs were extracted from the FAA Consolidated
Personnel Management Information System (CPMIS)
for each fiscal year. There was one CPMIS record in
a year for each controller. The OE and CPMIS
records were matched by controller identifier and
year, producing a database with 51,898 matched
records. The number of ATCS with and without OEs
is presented by fiscal year in Table 1. For example, of
the 7,178 non-supervisory ATCS stationed at
ARTCCs in FY1997, 6,864 (95.6%) had no
operational errors, while 303 controllers (4.2%) had
one OE, and 11 had 2 errors (0.2%). No ATCS had 3
errors in that fiscal year.
Methodological Considerations
Both CNAC (1995) and Broach (1999) calculated the
dependent variable of interest as the ratio of
controllers with errors in an experience or age range
to the total number of controllers in that experience
or age range. CNAC labeled this ratio as the
“likelihood” of involvement in an error. In fact, both
CNAC and Broach calculated the proportion of
controllers in a given category that were involved in
an error at a given point in time, that is, the
prevalence rate. The result is a person-based estimate
of risk. However, a person-based estimate of risk
does not take into account the varying degrees of
exposure between controllers. For example, a
controller working a busy, low-altitude transitional
sector with multiple merging airways that feed a
major hub during an afternoon rush will have a
greater opportunity to commit an OE than another
controller working a high-altitude sector with sparse
cross-continental traffic in steady, predictable
east/west flows. Time on position may vary as well.
For example, a controller working longer on a given
position will have greater opportunity to commit an
OE than another controller working less time on a
position. As noted by Della Rocco, Cruz, and
Clemens (1999), a measure of exposure is required to
analyze the risk of being involved in an OE
appropriately. However, such measures were
unavailable for the present study, leaving the count of
errors and prevalence as the variables of interest.
Analysis of counts, such as the number of OEs
committed by a controller during a specified period

of time, poses analytic challenges. Events such as
OEs are rare, compared to the number of operations
in the air traffic control system, the number of hours
worked by controllers, or even the number of
controllers working. While rare events such as OEs
are important because of their signal value and
potential costs, they are also difficult to study (Hulin
& Rousseau, 1980). Techniques borrowed from
epidemiology such as count-oriented regression have
proven useful in the analysis of rare events. Poisson
regression, a count-oriented regression technique,
was used in the present study to investigate the
degree to which the number of errors is related to
controller age.
Poisson Regression
Poisson regression is a statistical technique used to
model the expected count of some event as a function
of one or more explanatory variables. Examples of
events that follow a Poisson distribution are doctor
visits, absenteeism in the workplace, mortgage prepayments and loan defaults, bank failures, insurance
claims, and airplane accidents (Cameron & Trivedi,
p. 11). In statistics, the “law of rare events” states that
the total number of events of interest will take,
approximately, the Poisson distribution if (a) the
event may occur in any of a large number of trials,
but (b) the probability of occurrence in any given trial
is small (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). This statistical
“law of rare events” might apply to air traffic control
operations as well: there are a large number of
aircraft under the control of a relatively large number
of controllers at any given moment, but the likelihood
of an OE for any given aircraft by any single
controller is very small. In this application, the
analytic goal was to model the number of OEs
incurred by a controller as a function of age and
experience (e.g., tenure in the FAA).
Procedure
The data for this analysis consisted of the 51,899
records for non-supervisory center controllers with
and without OEs for the period FY1997 through
FY2003 (see Table 1). Tenure was recoded into
discrete categories to simplify the analysis. The first
category for tenure was based on the average of about
three years required to complete on-the-job training
for center controllers (Manning, 1998). The next
interval was 6-years wide (4 through 9), followed
five-year increments (Table 2). Age was recoded into
two groups: age 55 and younger; and age 56 and
older. This split was used to specifically assess the
risk that might be associated with controllers older
than the mandatory separation age.
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Table 1: N non-supervisory en route ATCS on-board with 0, 1, 2, or 3 operational errors by fiscal year
N ATCS with Operational Errors (OEs)
Fiscal Year

0

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

6,864
6,932
6,869
6,833
6,827
7,110
7,410

1

2

3

AOB Total

303
389
422
487
549
416
313

11
16
21
31
45
32
17

0
0
0
0
1
0
1

7,178
7,337
7,312
7,351
7,422
7,558
7,741

Table 2: Tenure by age cross-classification table for Poisson regression analysis
Number of OEs (nij)
Tenure Group

LE Age 55

LE 3 Years
4 – 9 Years
10 – 14 Years
15 – 19 Years
20 – 24 Years
GE 25 Years

44
488
1,112
1,007
343
142

ATCS Population (Nij)

GE Age 56

The data were aggregated by fiscal year, age group,
and tenure group to create a cross-classification table
suitable for Poisson regression, as shown in Table 2.
The columns labeled “Number of OEs (nij)” contain
the counts of OEs reported for each age and tenure
group combination. For example, there were 44 OEs
in the period FY1997 to FY2003 for controllers age
55 or less and with 3 years or less tenure, and 4 OEs
for controllers age 56 or older and with 3 years or
less tenure. The columns labels “ATCS Population
(Nij)” contain data representing the number of
controllers “exposed” to the risk of incurring an OE
during the observation period for each age-tenure
combination. For example, there were 3,587 records
for en route controllers age 55 or less with 3 years or
less tenure who were “at risk” of incurring an OE
during the observation period. The goal of the
regression analysis is to assess the relative effects of
age and tenure on the ratios of errors to “at risk”
population. The SPSS® version 11.5 General
Loglinear (GENLOG; SPSS, 1999) method was used
to conduct the Poisson regression analysis
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The initial analyses consisted of simple descriptive
statistics. First, the number of OEs per age group for
the observation period (FY1997 through 2003) was

4
10
20
2
2
57

LE Age 55
3,587
7,574
15,758
14,816
5,615
2,587

GE Age 56
110
191
280
128
67
1,186

examined, as shown in Table 2. In this analysis, each
controller could have as many as seven records, one
for each fiscal year. The records were pooled and
then broken out by the number of OEs reported for
that age group across the 7 years of observation. As
shown in Tables 2, most controllers were not
involved in an operational error during the 7-year
period. Moreover, the error distribution appears to be
similar to the distribution of age, that is, more errors
are observed for the more populous age groups. The
distribution of controllers with no and one or more
OEs by age group is illustrated in Figure 1, relative to
the age distribution for all non-supervisory enroute
controllers. As found by Spahn in 1977, the
distribution of errors by age was very similar to the
distribution of age across controllers. No particular
age group appeared to experience OEs at a rate
disproportionate to their representation in the
workforce.
Poisson Regression
Overall, the Poisson regression model fit the data
poorly (Likelihood Ratio χ2 = 283.81, p < .001). The
parameter estimate for the main effect of age (3.50)
was significantly different from 0 (with a 95%
confidence interval of 3.29 – 3.70), as were the
parameter estimates for tenure. To consider the effect
of age across tenure, the two age groups were
contrasted. The Generalized Log-Odds Ratio was
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40.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
OE>=1
OE=0
Total ATCS

LE 30

31-35

36-40

41-45

46-50

51-55

56-60

GE 61

4.8
8.0
7.9

19.6
18.7
18.8

34.2
30.7
30.9

24.3
22.9
23.0

8.8
9.6
9.6

5.3
6.1
6.1

2.2
3.1
3.0

0.7
0.8
0.8

Figure 1: OE Involvement by age group compared to distribution of age for all ARTCC controllers, FY1997-2003
used to estimate the odds ratio for age, that is, the odds
of OE involvement for older (GE age 56) controllers
(see SPSS, 1999, p. 202 – 203). The odds of OE
involvement for older controllers (GE age 56) were
1.02 times greater than the odds for younger (LE age
55) controllers, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.42
to 1.64. A confidence interval for the odds ratio that
includes 1.0 indicates that the odds of involvement for
the two groups are equal: neither age group was less or
more likely to be involved in an OE.

particularly speed of processing, may result in slower
and less efficient performance. On the other hand,
experience is gained with age, and compensatory
strategies and meta-strategies may result in safer and
more efficient performance by controllers. Additional
research on OEs, age, and ATCS performance is
recommended to extend and confirm the findings of
the present study.

Discussion
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The Poisson regression analysis did not support the
hypothesis that the likelihood of involvement in an en
route OE increased with age. This finding
undermines the explicit assertion that early retirement
of controllers was “primarily a safety measure”
(Testimony of Donald Francke, U.S. House of
Representatives, 1971). As noted by Li, Baker,
Grabowski, Qiang, McCarthy and Rebok (2003), age
in and of itself may have little bearing on safetyrelated outcomes if factors such as individual job
experience, workload, traffic complexity, and timeon-position are taken into consideration (p. 878). For
example, supervisors may assign older controllers to
less difficult sectors or provide assign an assistant
controller during periods of heavy traffic. All other
things being equal, age may influence performance
through two conflicting pathways. On the one hand,
the inevitable changes in cognitive function,
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End notes:
Mandatory separation is not required for controllers
hired before May 16, 1972. The number of
controllers age 56 and older increased from 155 in
FY1997 to 488 in FY2003.
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